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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:46 am
Time: 2:46 am
Results for organized crime groups
2 results foundAuthor: Home Office Title: Serious and Organized Crime: Home Office Research Priorities 2018/19 - 2020/21 Summary: Summary This document summarises research priorities to support the current and future needs of the Government's 2018 serious and organised crime (SOC) strategy. It aims to set out clearly the most important areas for research and analysis in this area, improving the evidence base on which policy choices are made and the targeting of resources on the most important risks and vulnerabilities. The research priorities presented here have been identified in discussion with a range of partners and relate specifically to the priorities set out in the current SOC strategy. This is to ensure that research is focused on the questions that are most relevant to current policy priorities and will have the greatest impact. They are grouped into the following four thematic areas, though there is considerable overlap between them and they should not be viewed in isolation. 1. Understanding the threat: It is likely that SOC will continue to operate in new ways and places. Improved research and intelligence in this area will help to develop a better evidence base on the changing landscape of SOC and the harms it presents. 2. Criminal markets: The supply and demand of illicit goods or services is a key characteristic of organised crime. Understanding more about the threat posed by SOC markets and their operating models will help to inform the most effective response. 3) Vulnerabilities: Organised crime groups (OCGs) exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals, businesses and society at large to further their criminal interests. Improving our understanding of the vulnerabilities of both victims and offenders will help to direct when and where to respond. 4. What works: The threat from SOC is complex and wide-ranging, requiring an equally diverse response. Improving the evidence base of what works in terms of prevention, disruption and tackling SOC, will achieve better value for money interventions. It can help to ensure that the most appropriate and up-to-date tools are used to respond at the most effective points. The remainder of this document sets out the key research questions underpinning these cross-cutting thematic topic areas, including a description of broad, high-level questions applying to the range of SOC threats as well as considering individual crime types where relevant. It also includes details of how we intend for this document to be used, outlines sources of funding for research and existing centres of expertise. Finally, it also includes contact details for Home Office analysts working in this area. We are committed to working collaboratively with the wider research community to improve the evidence base on SOC. Details: London, UK: Home Office, 2018. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/753188/serious-and-organised-crime-research-priorities-horr105.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/753188/serious-and-organised-crime-research-priorities-horr105.pdf Shelf Number: 154048 Keywords: Criminal MarketsEvidence-Based PolicyIllicit ServicesIllicit TradeOrganized CrimeOrganized Crime GroupsSerious and Organized Crime |
Author: McBride, David Title: Who is a Member? Targeted Killings against Members of Organized Armed Groups Summary: INTRODUCTION This paper argues that the most practical and legally correct definition is somewhere between the extreme views of Dr Melzer or the one hand, and Brigadier General Watkin on the other. It is submitted, to be properly categorized as a 'member of organized armed group' a person does not have to directly inflict harm in one causal step on a recurrent basis. However, neither should 'a cook' be properly considered a 'member of an organized armed group'. A more accurate reflection of who is a legitimately targetable member of an organized armed group is based not on the harm the individual causes, but simply on conduct that shows they intentionally enable the operational activities of the group. Accordingly, this paper will submit that a more satisfactory way of defining them will come from simply considering whether they form part of the 'armed force', in a not dissimilar way one might recognise a State Armed force, without recourse to formal membership, or indicia such as uniforms. This is quite a different test to one used to decide whether a civilian has lost his protection from attack, and I submit it produces a more logical representation of an armed group than a test that is based on an individual's proximity to the causing of harm, let alone one based on the causing of harm in a single causal step. Details: S.L., 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 21, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261128 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261128 Shelf Number: 154338 Keywords: Armed ForceArmed GroupsCriminal GroupsCriminal NetworksOrganized CrimeOrganized Crime GroupsTargeted Killings |